( SP Shukla, convener of Indian People’s Campaign against WTO and ex-member of Planning Commission, analyses the deadlock at Cancun Ministerial Meet and warns against complacence that may result in a rehash of Geneva Surrender of 1989)
Cancun did not exist on the map of Mexico only three decades ago. It was constructed literally out of nothing on a beach on the south-eastern tip of Mexico for the indulgence of the rich American tourists. But it is a name not unfamiliar to those who have been keeping track of the long and chequered history of the North-South dialogue. Cancun was in the news once before. And it was bad news for the South. It was at Cancun in 1981 that Ronald Reagan finally buried the North-South dialogue of the 1970s.
What does the recent news from Cancun portend for the South? For India? Let us first get the facts clear. The WTO ministerial meeting at Cancun was a mid-term meeting of the Doha Round launched in November 2001.The break-down of the Cancun meeting does not signify the break-down of the Doha round. In the past too, mid-term ministerial meetings have foundered, e.g., the Montreal ministerial meeting in December 1988 which was the mid-term ministerial of the Uruguay Round launched in September 1986. It broke down as there was no agreement on Agriculture, TRIPS, Textiles and Safeguards. The tussle on Agriculture was then mainly between EEC and the Cairns Group countries (A group of 17 agricultural exporting countries including Canada, 8 Latin American countries, 4 Southeast Asian countries, 2 African countries, and Australia & New Zealand formed in 1986 – Ed.). The resistance on the other three issues was essentially put up by India and Brazil. But the space so obtained by preventing unfavourable decisions in these areas in Montreal was soon lost as the Government of India succumbed to the bilateral pressures, mainly from USA; withdrew its opposition; and agreed, in April 1989, to bringing in the substantive aspects of intellectual property rights within the scope of the negotiations. That signaled not only the paradigm change for the GATT system but also the end of the solidarity of the South strenuously built over the years under the leadership of India and Brazil. The seed of the all-embracing and coercive WTO system that emerged in 1995 was sown in April 1989, ironically, soon after, and in spite of, the successful manoeuvre at the Montreal meeting to win space for the sustained fight to resist such an outcome!
The “Statement” adopted by the ministers in the wrap-up session of the Cancun meeting is vague on the exact stage of negotiations reached at Cancun and the direction of further work to be done. It merely calls for “more work … to be done in some key areas to enable us to proceed toward the conclusion of the negotiations.” Having failed themselves to resolve the deadlock, the Ministers have now instructed their subordinate officials and the Director-General of WTO to continue working on the outstanding issues! A specific date i.e.15 December 2003 has been indicated by which a meeting of the General Council of WTO has to be convened at the official level. The Statement adds: “We will bring with us into this new phase all the valuable work that has been done at this Conference. In those areas where we have reached a high level of convergence on texts, we undertake to maintain this convergence while working for an acceptable overall outcome. Notwithstanding this setback, we reaffirm all our Doha Declarations and Decisions and recommit ourselves to working to implement them fully and faithfully.” 1 It is all very well to sound positive in the face of a clear deadlock. But where does it leave the process of negotiations? The palpable and repeatedly stated differences leave unbridgeable gaps in the crucial areas of Agriculture, the Singapore Issues and Non-Agriculture Market Access. Where then is “a high degree of convergence of texts”? Is it to be presumed that there was near-agreement, behind the scenes, on issues like Services, Special and Differential Treatment and Implementation? And what were the contents of such agreement? This becomes important because the stated positions spoke of large differences on these issues too.
There is a feeling of some relief that the deadlock at Cancun has kept the Singapore issues at bay, confining them to the clarification process which commenced at Doha two years ago. But one must not forget that the Doha Declaration clearly “recognizes the case for a multilateral framework” for all the new issues and the last two years have witnessed deliberations on the new issues which have verged on negotiations. Moreover, the strong opposition put forward by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the least developed countries and some others, to negotiations proper being launched on these issue, has been mainly on the ground that they wanted the clarification process to continue. And there are reports that India was not averse to a “compromise” by agreeing to launching negotiations on two of the Singapore Issues viz. “Government Procurement” and “Trade Facilitation”, while asking for continuation of the clarificatory process on the remaining issues of “Investment” and “Trade facilitation”. The fact of the matter is that the Doha legacy of allowing the bridgehead for further attack by the developed countries and their multinationals on our autonomy of policy-making is very much alive and the deadlock in Cancun by itself is not enough to avert that onslaught.
The other area of deep divisions at Cancun was the issue of Agriculture. Not too long ago, the advocates and apologists of WTO (and the Agreement on Agriculture which was its integral part) had created illusions about enormous prospects for agricultural exports. The actual operation of the Agreement on Agriculture, combined with the impact of the so-called economic reforms, over the last few years, has left no doubt in the minds of our peasantry and farmers that, for them, there is little to gain and much to lose, in the WTO regime. The unprecedented distress which our agriculture is experiencing is not admitted by our Government. But the swelling discontent in the rural hinterland on this account has not escaped at least some sections in the ruling establishment. That explains the Government stance of strong criticism of the domestic support and export subsidy regimes of EU and USA. And the consequent role the Indian Delegation has played in contributing to the emergence and solidarity of G-21 in the Cancun context. But here too, the Government is under the illusion that emphasis on reduction in domestic support and subsidies of EU and USA may provide them enough room to continue with adequate level of tariffs to protect the interests of the Indian peasantry. The latest draft on the table at Cancun presented by the Chairman of the meeting not only was soft on both EU an USA in regard to their regimes of support and subsidies but also left no doubt whatsoever that the markets of populous countries like India and China were the main focus of the market-access area of negotiations. The proposals contained provisions to reduce tariffs in developing countries substantially and at a faster rate. Not only that. They contained a provision to bind a designated number of tariff lines to as low level of tariff as between 0 and 5%! There is the real danger to our agriculture. And nothing short of reclaiming and asserting the unqualified right to impose quantitative restrictions on agriculture imports can save our agriculture and the livelihood of the seventy percent of our peoples. Government of India’s stand is long on rhetoric about what EU and USA must do about the support and subsidies they give to their agriculture. But our Government is totally silent on the vital issue of the quantitative restrictions, a right that it has to claim and exercise in the interest of our peasantry and people.
Similarly, the Government has not opposed the formulations in the latest draft declaration at Cancun on Services where the aim of the negotiations was sought to be reduced simply to “progressively higher levels of liberalisation” of services sectors while the General Agreement on Trade in Services itself unambigously and explicitly recognises the development dimension. It has not also expressed itself against the supply of services like Health, Education, Water Supply etc which constitute basic human rights, being commodified in the name of liberalisation.
The danger is that trade majors will now resort to the bilateral processes to complete the unfinished tasks of Cancun. Important members of G-21 as well as the ACP and other groupings will be subjected to pressures and blandishments. As we have seen, there are openings available and signals given to make such process possible. And it is here that the solidarity of the South will be tested.
That the break-down of Cancun meeting has averted the immediate disaster in the areas of agriculture and the Singapore issues is a positive development. And all those in the camp of the South (whether in the Conference hall or outside) who brought it about deserve congratulations. The task now is to ensure that the space gained at Cancun is not allowed to be frittered away in the next three months or so, when the bilateral arm-twisting will be rampant. In other words, no repeat of “Geneva Surrender” of April 1989 should be allowed.
What are the prospects of averting this danger? In some respects the objective situation is perhaps more favourable now than in the spring of 1989. April 1989 signified the end of the solidarity of the South. Cancun, on the contrary, has witnessed re-emergence of the solidarity of the South, after a long interval of good thirteen years. All those who were wishing away the existence of South, (including a section of intellectuals and some governments in the South, including our own!) and jumping for opportunist, issue-based coalitions cutting across the reality of the North-South divide, have received a rude shock. The leaders of the North have felt the sting acutely. Which explains the reported outbursts of Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner and Robert Zoellick, USTR. Lamy called the processes in Cancun through which the majority of the developing countries found some voice as “medieval”. The USTR Robert Zoellick, at his press conference was arrogant, and said: “If countries want to behave like in the UN and only make demands instead of negotiations making inflammatory rhetoric then trade negotiations are not possible.” He virtually cursed the G 21.2
For the emerging solidarity to survive and become stronger, it is obvious that countries like India, Brazil, China and South Africa have to band together in evolving common strategies and not attempt to cut short-sighted, bilateral deals. For us in India, it is important to ensure through popular pressure that the opportunity offered by the interregnum is utilized by Government to further strengthen the stand on agriculture and services as indicated earlier. In the spring of 1989, the issue that the Americans were pushing for was intellectual property rights, an esoteric area which then had little potential for generating mass enthusiasm for resistance. Now in the aftermath of Cancun, it is the opening of our markets for imports of agricultural products that is being sought by EU and USA and this affects the very livelihood of the majority of our people.
Already there is resistance developing to the government policies in this area. And no government can afford to ignore it except at its own peril. It is equally important that the Government is persuaded to give up the ambiguity in its stand on all the four Singapore issues. If that happens, the Government will have the backing of a truly national consensus supporting it in WTO. This will also augur well for the emerging solidarity of the South.
1 and 2: : Vide “Civil Society hails Cancun Failure” by C. Raghavan in SUNS BULLETIN NO. 5419 DATED 16.9.03: North-South Development Monitor (Electronic Edition), published by Third World Network, Geneva, Chief Editor: C. Raghavan